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Abstract 
Simulation models implemented using a range of parameters offer a useful approach to identifying 
effective disease intervention strategies. The objective of this study was to investigate the effects of key 
control strategies to mitigate the simultaneous spread of influenza among and between swine and 
human populations. We used the pandemic H1N1 2009 virus as a case study. The study population 
included swine herds (488 herds) and households-of-people (29,707 households) within a county in 
Ontario, Canada. Households were categorized as: (i) rural households with swine workers, (ii) rural 
households without swine workers, and (iii) urban households without swine workers. Seventy two 
scenarios were investigated based on a combination of the parameters of speed of detection and 
control strategies, such as quarantine strategy, effectiveness of movement restriction, and ring 
vaccination strategy, all assessed at three levels of transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human 
interface. Results showed that the speed of detection of the infected units combined with the 
quarantine strategy had the largest impact on the duration and size of outbreaks. A combination of fast 
to moderate speed of the detection (where infected units were detected within five to 10 days since 
first infection) and quarantine of the detected units alone contained the outbreak within the swine 
population in most of the simulated outbreaks. Ring vaccination had no added beneficial effect. In 
conclusion, our study suggests that the early detection (and therefore effective surveillance) and 
effective quarantine had the largest impact in the control of the influenza spread, consistent with earlier 
studies. To our knowledge no study had previously assessed the impact of the combination of different 
intervention strategies involving the simultaneous spread of influenza between swine and human 
populations. 
Keywords: One-health, modelling, zoonotic diseases, influenza, pigs, humans, NAADSM 
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Introduction 
Pandemics caused by influenza A viruses, including the most recent outbreak involving the pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 2009 (pH1N1) virus, continue to present a significant zoonotic threat to human and 
animal populations. Constant outbreaks of H5N1 in Asia (OIE, 2013), and recent outbreaks of a novel 
swine-origin H3N2 variant virus in the United States (Lindstrom et al., 2012), and bird-origin H7N9 virus 
in China (Gao et al., 2013, Uyeki and Cox, 2013) are examples of the current public health concerns. 
Many countries have developed influenza pandemic preparedness plans following the World Health 
Organization guidelines to prevent or mitigate the impact of future influenza pandemics (WHO, 2011). 
The main mitigation measures against influenza pandemics are public health measures (also known as 
non-pharmaceutical) and medical or pharmaceutical interventions (WHO, 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Halloran et al., 2008, Lee et al., 2009). Public health measures include personal hygiene such as hand 
washing, the use of personal protective equipment (face-masks, gloves, etc.), and social distancing 
measures (quarantine and isolation, school closure, restrictions on gathering at public events and on 
travel, etc.). The main medical interventions against influenza include anti-viral prophylaxis and 
treatment, as well as vaccination. 
 
Recently, computer simulation and mathematical models have been widely used to compare or 
investigate the effectiveness of intervention strategies against influenza pandemics. In human 
populations these have included simulations that evaluate individual intervention strategies or a 
combination of such interventions (Lee et al., 2009, Dorjee et al., 2012). Relatively few simulation 
modelling studies have been reported that seek to assess the control of influenza outbreaks in animals 
(Dorjee et al., 2012). Only one modelling study has investigated the simultaneous spread of influenza 
among and between swine and human populations (Saenz et al., 2006). This is despite the fact that 
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swine are widely considered to be a potential host for the emergence of novel pandemic influenza 
strains, and frequent reports of the transmission of influenza between swine and people (Myers et al., 
2006, Myers et al., 2007, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009, Lindstrom et al., 2012). Several 
countries have reported the transmission of pH1N1 2009 virus from humans to swine (Nelson et al., 
2012). Therefore, it is imperative to understand the transmission dynamic of influenza and the 
effectiveness of mitigation strategies at the swine-human interface. 
 
Models enable researchers to simulate thousands of virtual influenza outbreaks and compare the 
effectiveness of control strategies under a range of scenarios, which cannot feasibly be implemented in 
real-world situations. The outcomes of such studies can guide and inform the development of 
contingency plans and policy for preparedness and response to future pandemic threats (Ferguson et al., 
2005, Longini et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, Basta et al., 
2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010). A systematic review of models exploring effectiveness of 
combination strategies for pandemic influenza response in human populations concluded that the 
combination of several control measures proved more beneficial than the use of only one particular 
measure (Lee et al., 2009). Most models in human populations assessed the intervention strategies that 
were targeted at the individual. Few studies in humans have also investigated the spread and control of 
influenza at the household level (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, Fraser, 2007, 
Shaban et al., 2009). Indeed, these studies noted that targeting intervention strategies such as isolation 
and quarantine, or vaccination and anti-viral prophylaxis at the household level was more pragmatic and 
likely more effective than at the individual level. In this case, the approach is similar to the types of 
disease control strategy that are implemented for livestock at the farm level. Targeting intervention 
measures at the household level in human population offers the added advantage of ensuring that the 
granularity of the simulation unit is the same for both animal and human populations. This enables the 
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modelling of zoonotic disease spread and control between animal and human population 
simultaneously using readily available modelling platform like North American Animal Disease Spread 
Model (NAADSM). NAADSM has built-in features to evaluate the effectiveness of the main disease 
control strategies against contagious diseases of livestock. These include the speed of disease detection 
and reporting, forward contact tracing of infected units, quarantine measure, vaccination and 
depopulation with or without zoning (disease control area within a specified radius around the detected 
units) (Harvey et al., 2007). 
 
While the previous study (Dorjee et al., 2014) assessed the transmission dynamic of the pH1N1 at the 
swine-human interface, this study was aimed to further use NAADSM to compare different control 
strategies against the spread of contagious zoonotic pathogens among and between swine and human 
populations. Specifically it investigated the effectiveness of the speed of detection and different 
intervention strategies, quarantine and movement control, and ring vaccination against the 
simultaneous spread of pH1N1 between swine and human populations. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Study area and populations 
The same study area and populations described in Dorjee et at., (2014) were used for this study. Briefly 
a county within the province of Ontario, Canada, with relatively high density of swine farms along with 
the existence of a range of rural and urban areas (one city and four towns) was selected. Swine herds 
(SH) and household population data were extracted from the official census of 2006 (Statistics Canada, 
2007b, Statistics Canada, 2007a) to ensure the correct representation of each of these populations 
within the model. Household populations were categorized as: (i) rural households with at least one 
swine worker (SWH), (ii) rural households without swine workers (RH), and (iii) urban households 
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without swine workers (UH). The SWH units served as the bridging population for pH1N1 virus 
transmission between swine and human populations. The sizes of swine herds and households were 
generated as described in Dorjee et at., (2014). The study population consisted of: 488 SH, 733 SWH, 
7,879 RH and 21,095 UH. As the specific geographic coordinates of all units were not available in the 
official census data, their geo-coordinate locations were randomly assigned within the agricultural areas 
(SH, SWH, and RH) and urban areas (UH) of the county. 
 
Model structure  
North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM)  
The supercomputer version of NAADSM 3.1.24 (NAADSM Development Team, 2008) was used for the 
construction and simulation of the models. NAADSM is a computer modelling platform for simulating 
the spread and control of contagious diseases in animal populations, either of the same or different 
species, or production types. It uses a stochastic, spatially explicit, state-transition method. The unit of 
disease spread is simulated at the farm or household level. It has provisions to compare the effect of the 
speed of detection and effectiveness of a number of different intervention strategies, such as 
quarantine and movement control, ring vaccination, and depopulation. The effectiveness of these 
measures can be compared with or without a disease control zone of a certain radius, along with 
forward contact tracing. A detailed description of NAADSM has been provided by Harvey et al, (2007) as 
well as by Hill and Reeves (2006). 
 
Model structure and the disease transmission  
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The disease spread model structure (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered [SEIR]) and the 
parameters associated with swine farms and households have been described previously (Dorjee et al., 
2014) but are provided in Tables 1 and 2 for completeness. The susceptible units consisted of herds or 
households that were not infected but were vulnerable to an infection; exposed/latent units were those 
that had been infected but were not shedding organisms; infectious units are units shedding organisms; 
while recovered units were those that had recovered and were immune to further infection. Permanent 
immunity was simulated by setting the duration of immunity to be longer than the simulated period 
(365 days). In addition, the same contact structure among swine herds (SH to SH), between SH and SWH, 
and among SWH, RH and UH as described in the previous study (Dorjee et al., 2014) were used and are 
reproduced in Table 3. 
 
For the influenza spread between SH and SWH, a contact was assumed to have occurred when the 
swine workers came in contact with pigs on farms (SH) during the course of their daily work. Similarly, 
for its spread amongst households, a contact was assumed to have occurred implicitly when an 
individual from an infectious household established an adequate contact with individuals from other 
households at any place, such as schools, workplaces or other social congregations. Individuals who 
become newly infected through contact with infectious person outside their home in turn infect other 
members at home and outside their home. The influenza transmissions between infectious and 
susceptible units through direct and indirect (spread between SH units through contaminated fomites) 
contacts were simulated as a function of contact rate, the probability of infection per contact and 
movement distance distribution between the units. 
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Furthermore, all assumptions of the model, including influenza transmission between units in different 
disease states, their transition from one state to another, and parameters relating to disease states, 
contact frequencies between pairs of units, and their transmission probabilities outlined in Dorjee et al., 
(2014) were adopted for this study. 
 
Control strategies 
The scenarios used for the evaluation of the control strategies against the influenza spread between 
swine and human populations are outlined in Figure 1. Three control strategies were evaluated: (i) 
quarantine without zoning, where only detected units were quarantined (No-zone strategy), (ii) 
quarantine with zoning, where all units (both swine herd and household populations) within a zone of 
3km radius were quarantined (With-zone strategy), and (iii) With-zone strategy plus ring vaccination of 
susceptible units (both swine herd and household populations) within a zone of 5 km radius of the 
detected unit. The size and duration of an influenza outbreak will depend on how soon an outbreak is 
detected to implement control measures, the type of control strategies, and effectiveness of 
implementation of these control strategies. Therefore, the effectiveness of these control strategies was 
compared at three levels for speed of detection (slow, moderate and fast), two levels for effectiveness 
of movement control of the quarantined units (less-effective and effective), and two levels for speed of 
commencement of ring vaccination (slow-trigger and fast-trigger). Furthermore, these control strategies 
were evaluated at three levels of transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human interface: (i) low 
animal to human - low human to animal (LL), (ii) medium animal to human - low human to animal (ML), 
and (iii) high animal to human - medium human to animal (HM). In total seventy two scenarios involving 
various combinations of speed of detection, control strategies and transmissibility of the virus at the 
swine-human interface were simulated. 
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Detection in NAADSM is defined as the product of two probabilities, (a) the probability of observing 
clinically ill and infectious units over time multiplied by (b) the probability of reporting such an observed 
unit over time (Hill and Reeves, 2006, Harvey et al., 2007). Each of these probabilities changes over time 
and it can be incorporated into the model as a linear function (Table 4 (a)). The probability of observing 
clinical signs would be expected to increase over time as more pigs in a swine herd or individuals in a 
household exhibit clinical signs. Similarly, the probability of reporting the detected infected units would 
be expected to increase over time due to a greater awareness following detection of the first few 
infected units. The fast, moderate and slow detections were defined as detection of 98% of infected 
units in 5, 10 and 20 days, respectively (Table 4 (a)). Not all infected units would be detected and 
reported. In this model, we assumed 2% of the infected units would never be detected. Furthermore, 
the detection was assumed to be 100% specific. 
 
In NAADSM once infected units have been detected, they are quarantined and no direct contact (100% 
reduction in the baseline contact rate) from or to these units is allowed. However, indirect contacts from 
and to the detected units are allowed. In the models the influenza spread was simulated through both 
direct (shipment of live animals from SH to SH) and indirect (movement of contaminated fomites from 
farm to farm) contacts among SH units, direct contact from SWH to SH units (movement of swine 
workers from SWH to swine farms), and indirect contact from SH to SWH (indirect contact was assumed 
through movement of swine workers from a SH to SWH as ƐǁŝŶĞǁŽŶ ?ƚďĞƐŚŝƉƉĞĚƚŽ^t, ?, and indirect 
contact (an implicit assumption when individuals from different households come in contact at 
workplaces, shopping malls, schools or other social gatherings) among household populations (SWH, RH 
and UH). To accommodate movement restriction even for indirect contacts in NAADSM an area of five-
meter radius zone was imposed around a given detected unit (SH and households) to restrict even the 
indirect contact to achieve the no-zone quarantine strategy (movement restriction of detected units 
10 
only). For the quarantine with-zone strategy both direct and indirect contacts of all susceptible units 
within the 3km radius of a detected unit were restricted. Forward contact tracing of all the direct and 
indirect contacts upon the detection of an infected unit was implemented for all population types. 
However, backward tracing was not implemented as the NAADSM version used for this study does not 
support this feature. All the direct and indirect contacts from the detected unit within 5 days 
(approximate maximum incubation period of the influenza infection) with a certain percentage of 
success were conducted (Table 4 [a]). All units successfully traced in this manner were automatically 
quarantined. 
 
In this study, quarantine measures were implemented as a percentage reduction in the baseline contact 
rate (both direct and indirect contacts) of each detected unit, or of all units within the disease control 
zone (with-zone strategy). It is not expected that a 100% movement restriction will be achieved in any 
disease outbreak situation. Therefore two scenarios, (a) less-effective and (b) effective reflecting the 
effectiveness of movement restrictions of the quarantined units were investigated (Table 4 (a)). Both 
movement restriction strategies achieved a 100% reduction in the baseline direct contacts (SH to SH, 
SWH to SH contacts) for all the detected units (the default setting in NAADSM), 95% reduction in the 
baseline direct contact of undetected units within the quarantine zone, and 80% reduction in the 
baseline indirect contacts of each units under the quarantine. However, in the case of ƚŚĞ “effective ? 
strategy, the reduction in contact rates was achieved in less than 5 days, whereas the same reduction 
was achieved in by day 10 in the case of ƚŚĞ “less-effective ? strategy. These assumptions were based on 
the informed judgment of co-authors as there was no information on these parameters in the literature. 
 
For the control strategy incorporating ring vaccination, the speed of initiation of the vaccination was 
evaluated using a slow and fast response (Figure 1). In the slow-trigger scenario, the ring vaccination of 
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all susceptible units within a radius of 5 km was triggered upon detecting 25 or more infected units. The 
fast-trigger began upon detecting 5 or more infected units (Table 4 (b)). A seven day delay in the onset 
of the immunity from the time of vaccination for SH (Lange et al., 2009) and households (Bresson et al., 
2006, Leroux-Roels et al., 2007, Milne et al., 2010) was assumed. Furthermore, the vaccine was assumed 
to be 100% protective with permanent immunity. The daily ring vaccination capacity increased from 20 
units to a maximum of 300 units per day within five days of starting vaccination for all populations. 
 
For each simulated outbreak, the infection was seeded (index case) into a single randomly selected 
swine herd (latent state). Each scenario was run for 1,000 iterations. Each of the iterations ran until no 
infected units remained in the populations or until 365 days had been simulated in the case of 
persistence of the infection. In all scenarios the randomly selected index swine herd was kept fixed. This 
was a choice limited by the version of NAADSM 3.1.24 (NAADSM Development Team, 2008) used in this 
study since it had no feature of seeding the infection randomly in a population at each iteration. 
Statistical analyses 
dŚĞŵŽĚĞůƐ ? outcomes were assessed in terms of the duration of the outbreak and total number of 
infected units. Summary statistics of these outcomes under each scenario of speed of detection, 
quarantine, movement restriction and ring vaccination strategies were generated. Furthermore, the 
effects of these control strategies at the three levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface 
were evaluated by fitting the survival and negative binomial regression models, for outbreak duration 
and number of infected units, respectively. Fitting these multivariable models allowed for assessment of 
interaction effects among control strategies on the outcomes. 
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An accelerated failure-time (AFT) survival model (using the generalized linear model function) was fitted 
with outbreak duration as the outcome variable, and the input parameters as the predictor variables. 
The predictors were entered into the model as categorical variables. The speed of detection was coded 
as 1 = Slow, 2 = Moderate, and 3 = Fast, quarantine strategy was coded as 1 = No-zone and 2 = With-
zone, movement restriction as 1 = Less-effective and 2 = Effective, ring vaccination strategy as 1 = No-
vaccination, 2 = Slow-trigger and 3 = Fast-trigger. All meaningful 2-way interactions among the 
predictors were evaluated and retained in the model if they were significant at P < 0.05 and if the 
difference in the predicted duration of the outbreak between any levels of the interaction term was 
greater than one-week duration. This criterion was used because even a small difference between the 
two interaction terms could be statistically significant simply due to large sample size. Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Cox-Snell residual plots were used to select the best fitting AFT 
parametric model and to evaluate the overall fit of the model, as described in Dohoo et al., (2009). 
Residuals were evaluated using deviance residual and plotting it against the fitted values or individual 
predictors. 
 
The effect of the predictors on the size of the outbreak was assessed using a negative binomial 
regression model. All predictors were entered into the model as described in the survival model above. 
Instead of building a separate model for each population type, the size of outbreak in each population 
type was combined into a common outcome variable, and the population type was entered into the 
model as a categorical predictor (coded as 1 = SH, 2 = SWH, 3 = RH, and 4 = UH). All meaningful two-way 
interactions among the predictors were examined and retained if they were significant at P< 0.05 and if 
the difference in the predicted number of infected units between any levels of the interaction term was 
>10 units. Model diagnostics and residuals were evaluated based on the deviance residual. 
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The results of the survival and the negative binomial regression models were presented in terms of 
predicted margins of median epidemic duration and number of infected units at the specific 
representative values of the covariates. All analyses were implemented in Stata version 12.1 (StataCorp. 
2011. Stata Statistical Software: Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP). 
 
Results 
Outbreak duration 
The AFT survival model with log-logistic distribution fitted the data best. All the control strategies had 
statistically significant effects on the outbreak duration. The time ratios of the final model of different 
control strategies are presented in Table 3. The difference in the median duration of outbreaks between 
with and without ring vaccination (ring vaccination category 2 or 3, versus 1) was 5 days, which was 
practically not a meaningful difference, although it was statistically significant (P < 0.05). As such, the 
ring vaccination strategy variable was excluded from the final model. Significant interactions between 
the effects of speed of detection and quarantine strategy, and between speed of detection and 
movement restriction strategy on the outbreak duration were observed. These effects were similar at all 
the three levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface. Therefore, only the results at the high 
transmissibility (HM) are presented. The interaction plot of speed of detection and quarantine strategy 
showed that the effect of these two control strategies depended upon each other (Figure 2). At the slow 
speed of detection, the outbreak duration was 4 times longer (208 days, 95% CI 207 W286 days) when no 
quarantine zone was used compared with when a 3km quarantine zone was used. However, at the 
moderate or fast speed of detection, the outbreak duration were approximately similar (<4 days) 
between the two quarantine strategies (Figure 2[a]). At no-zone quarantine strategy, the outbreak 
duration was 6 W8 times longer (238 W239 days) when the speed of detection was slow than when it was 
moderate or fast. However, this difference was relatively smaller (34 W40 days longer) when a quarantine 
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zone of 3km was imposed (with-zone quarantine strategy) (Figure 2[a]). These effects were similar at 
both the levels of the effectiveness of movement restriction strategy (which is a covariate in the final 
model) (Figure 2[a] and 2[b]). Similar interaction effects between the speed of detection and the 
movement restriction strategies on the duration of outbreak were observed but of much lesser 
magnitude at both levels of the quarantine strategies (Figure 3[a] and 3[b]). The overall duration was 
much shorter when a 3km quarantine zone was imposed compared with when a detected units only 
were quarantined (no-zone quarantine strategy (Figure 3[a] versus 3[b]). 
 
Outbreak size 
The overall percentages of units infected was <1% (median values) for all the population types. The 
overall 95th percentile of units infected was: SH 10%, SWH 11%, RH 3% and UH 1%. The multivariable 
negative binomial regression results showed that all the control strategies, except the vaccination 
strategy (P = 0.172) had a statistically significant effect on the size of the outbreak in all the population 
types. All two-way interactions between the control strategies and population type on the size of 
outbreak were significant. Furthermore, the interactions between the speed of detection and 
quarantine strategy or movement restriction strategy were significant. These effects were again similar 
at all three levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface. Therefore, only results at the high 
transmissibility of the virus (HM) are presented. The count ratios of the number of infected units under 
different control strategies and their interaction terms are presented in Table 6. The interaction effect 
between the speed of detection and quarantine strategy on the size of outbreak suggested that 
imposing quarantine zone around the detected units was beneficial only at the slow detection level 
(Figure 4). No difference in the size of the outbreak was observed between the two quarantine 
strategies at the moderate or fast detection levels. These effects were similar in all the population types 
at both the levels of movement restriction strategies. However, the magnitude of difference between 
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the two quarantine strategies on the size of the outbreak at slow detection was smaller at the effective 
than at less-effective movement strategies; less by 33 and 174 units in SH and UH populations, 
respectively. 
 
Similarly, the size of outbreak between the two movement restriction strategies was significantly 
different at the slow detection level, with no difference observed in moderate or high detection levels 
(Figure 5). Furthermore, the difference in the effect was observed only at the no-zone quarantine 
strategy. No difference between the two movement restriction strategies was observed at all levels of 
the detection at the with-zone quarantine strategy (Figure not shown). 
 
Model and residual diagnostics 
The smallest and largest deviance residuals of the AFT survival model were -3.43 and 5.10 respectively. 
However, less than 1% of the iteration had the deviance residuals above or below r3. The deviance chi-
squared goodness-of-fit test of the negative binomial model did not indicate any lack of fit (P = 0.999). 
The smallest and largest deviance residuals of negative binomial regression were -4.14 and 9.62 
respectively. However, less than 1% of the iterations had the deviance residuals above or below r3. 
Therefore the numbers of outlying residuals were within the acceptable range. Excluding these 
iterations with outlying residuals had negligible impact on the estimates of both the models. No patterns 
in the distribution of these outlying residuals were observed in terms of the covariate patterns. 
Therefore these residuals might explain the extent of the stochastic variation over and above those 
explained by the predictors in the models. 
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Discussion 
This study investigated the effectiveness of key control strategies against the simultaneous spread of the 
influenza between swine and human populations using the NAADSM modelling platform. We used 
pH1N1 virus as a case study because it is easily transmissible between human and swine populations 
(Howden et al., 2009, Nelson et al., 2012). Simulations of thousands of virtual disease outbreak events 
under a defined set of input parameters in the model offer a useful tool to compare effective 
intervention strategies. Results from such studies can provide guidance for making policy decisions and 
developing disease contingency plans and preparedness for future pandemic threats. To our knowledge 
(Dorjee et al., 2012) no study has investigated the combination of intervention strategies in situations 
involving influenza spread between swine and human populations simultaneously. 
 
The results of this study showed that under the assumptions given in the models, differences in speed of 
detection had the largest effect on the size and duration of the outbreaks. They suggested that a fast to 
moderate speed of detection (98% detection within 5 to 10 day period) combined with the quarantine 
of detected units alone (No-zone quarantine strategy) would control the outbreak in 30 W40 days with 
only a single SH unit and no household unit infected in most instances (Figure 2 and Figure 4). If the 
detection of the majority of infected units (41 W98% of the units) was delayed by 11 W20 days, the 
implementation of the zone-based quarantine strategy (in which both the infected and susceptible units 
within a 3km radius of the detected infected units are quarantined) was a better alternative strategy. It 
could be argued that even the slow detection defined in this study was relatively effective because in 
reality it might take weeks to a few months to recognize a novel influenza virus originating in swine to 
be of potential pandemic threat. Its effective transmission from person to person would have to be 
known before serious public health intervention measures are initiated. However, if control measures 
were implemented in a manner defined in this study for any serious influenza outbreak in swine, 
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irrespective of knowing its potential pandemic threat to people, the outbreak can be contained within 
the swine population alone. This would mitigate the likelihood of occurrence of future influenza 
pandemics. The transmission of the influenza from swine to swine workers can be prevented following 
strict personal hygiene and protective equipment, including anti-viral prophylaxis in the case of influenza 
outbreaks, preventing serious threat to human health (Hayden, 2001, Ramirez et al., 2006, McCaw and 
McVernon, 2007, Handel et al., 2009). 
 
A similar time-frame for speed of detection and implementation of control measures was used for 
pandemic influenza spread in humans by Longini et al (2005), where delay times of 7, 14, or 21 days 
after the detection of the first case were investigated. However, Ferguson et al (2005) used the 
threshold of 20 or more cases (individuals rather than households) to initiate the implementation of the 
control strategies, as opposed to a delay measured in days. The finding that speed of detection has the 
largest impact on the modelled outcomes in this study was consistent with these other studies that 
compared the similar control strategies targeted at the household level and used zones of a certain 
radius around infected cases (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Shaban et al., 2009). 
 
Given the assumptions in the model, including the speed of detection and the movement restriction 
levels defined in this study, it was apparent that the ring vaccination strategy did not offer an additional 
beneficial effect. This also suggests that in the presence of an effective surveillance system which 
detects any disease spread rapidly, combined with effective quarantine and movement restriction, a 
vaccine will have limited value as an additional response measure. As an appropriate vaccine may not be 
available during the early phase of the emergence of a novel virus, focusing on rapid detection and 
effective quarantine measures may be practical and sufficient. However, as the disease transmission and 
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contact parameters used in this study were based on a number of assumptions rather than having been 
calibrated to real outbreak data, this finding must be interpreted cautiously. Ring vaccination may also 
entail additional costs to swine producers and public health authorities, and may effectively increase the 
contact rates through increasing movements of people during the vaccination process. However, other 
indirect benefits such as reducing panic in people (by doing something), in addition to the direct benefits 
associated with increased herd immunity should be taken in consideration. Therefore, additional 
sensitivity analysis to assess the effect of vaccination, particularly in the circumstances of delayed speed 
of detection, reduced effectiveness of movement restriction (that is the compliance rate of quarantine 
measures) at a wide range of reproductive numbers or varied rates of transmissibility of the virus, 
should be explored in future studies. 
 
For this study we have compared the effect of control strategies under the scenario of the pH1N1 
seeded (index case) in a swine farm only, due to time constraint and due to the fact that a novel 
influenza virus may most likely originate in animal than human populations. However, it would be 
worthwhile for future studies to investigate the effects of similar control strategies under scenario 
where the virus was seeded in a human population. 
 
In this study the control strategies were targeted at the farm or household levels, in contrast to most 
studies in human populations where control strategies are targeted at the individual level (Germann et 
al., 2006, Nuno et al., 2007, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010). However, 
other studies have highlighted the importance of investigating the spread and control strategies 
targeted at the household level together with zones of certain radius (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et 
al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, Fraser, 2007). These studies justify such approaches on the basis that most 
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influenza transmission occurs within households and that cases tend to be clustered within localities. 
Furthermore, they highlight the fact that anti-viral treatment and prophylaxes, as well as quarantine 
measures, are more practical and effective if targeted at the whole household and/or a zone of a certain 
radius, rather than at the individual level. For these reasons the need to estimate influenza spread 
parameters, such as the reproduction number at household level, had been emphasized (Cauchemez et 
al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, Fraser, 2007). Therefore, a choice as to the granularity of simulation unit 
and approach to control strategy evaluation adopted in this study, were consistent with the approaches 
highlighted as being important by a number of other authors. 
 
The results of this study indicated that NAADSM is a feasible platform on which to model the 
simultaneous spread and control of contagious zoonotic diseases between swine and human 
populations. The main limitation of this study was the lack of empirical data on pH1N1 outbreaks in a 
usable form at the swine herd or household levels, to calibrate the model when comparing different 
intervention strategies. Information on contact frequencies between SWH, RH and UH were not 
available so assumptions were based on the informed judgement of co-authors, which may have 
introduced bias in the estimates. The contact rates among households were assumed to be equal to the 
average daily contact rate of an individual person for UH units, or half this rate for SWH and RH units. 
This may have underestimated the spread of the disease because each household has, on average three 
members, and therefore the actual contact rate between households would likely be higher. 
Futhermore, the references (Mossong et al., 2008, Lee et al., 2010) from which these contact rates were 
extracted did not specify what proportion of any daily average contact rate related to contacts between 
members of the same household, or among and between different household/occupational groups (e.g. 
swine workers, rural non-swine workers or urban households). Therefore, the magnitude and direction 
of any introduced bias on the estimates of the spread of the disease in these populations could not be 
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predicted. Future work could examine the effects of these parameters on the modelled spread of the 
virus through more extensive sensitivity analysis. The roles of other occupational groups such as 
veterinarians, abattoir workers and transport opreators who come into contact with swine, and who 
may play an important role in influenza spread, were not considered. Similarly the role of live swine 
markets was not considered. These limitation may have underestimated the spread of influenza in the 
study populations to a certain extent. Nevertheless, this study provides useful insights into the effect of 
strategic combinations of intervention measures, with findings that were similar to those arising from 
studies that have modelled influenza spread only in human populations.  
 
A number of E^D ?Ɛgeneral limitations were outlined in Dorjee et al., (2014). In addition, when 
modelling control strategies some of the limitations include: it assumes the detection is 100% specific 
(no false positives), no capability for tracing the contacts of detected units backward, units are 
quarantined permanently till the end of the simulation period, and there is no capability to assess the 
effects of school or workplace closure along with the quarantine of households. Imposing permanent 
quarantine measures for swine herds may be realistic but this is not the case for households, particularly 
when the duration of the outbreak is prolonged. In human studies the members of infected households 
have typically been quarantined for 7 W21 days (Ferguson et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 
2006). The NAADSM version used in this study does not have a specific feature to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the anti-viral treatment or prophylaxis measures. The feature evaluating the ring 
vaccination can be used to mimic anti-viral prophylaxis by setting the delay time to immunity to one day 
following vaccination. However, this approach would mean that it would not be possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the anti-viral and the ring vaccination strategies simultaneously. In addition, ring 
vaccination or anti-viral treatment would be assumed to be 100% protective, which is not likely realistic. 
Finally, it should be noted that it was not the intention of this study to provide quantitative predictions 
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(given that several assumptions had to be made in the absence of empirical data); rather the study 
attempted to provide a better qualitative assessment of the impacts of combining various control 
strategies. Therefore, the reader should interpret the findings of this study in terms of relative 
magnitude rather than focusing on the quantitative outputs of the models. 
 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrated that effective quarantine, based on the early detection of infected units alone, 
would have the largest impact in limiting influenza outbreaks in swine populations with negligible 
spread to humans, under the assumptions present in this model. A moderate speed of detection (98% 
detection within a 5 to 10 day period) combined with quarantine of the detected units alone (i.e. 
without the implementation of any zone-based quarantine strategy) would control the outbreak in 30 W
40 days with only a single SH unit and no household units becoming infected in most instances. If the 
detection of the majority of infected units (41 W98% of the units) was delayed by 11 W20 days, the 
implementation of a zone-based quarantine strategy (in which both the infected and susceptible units 
within a 3km radius of any detected infected units are quarantined) was a better strategy. The modelling 
approach and the exploration of effectiveness of a combination of key control strategies assessed in this 
study is suitable for modelling contagious zoonotic pathogens as they spread among and between 
animal and human populations. Furthermore, this study demonstrated that NAADSM offers a feasible 
and readily useable platform for such an undertaking. It is recommended that concerted efforts should 
be made to collect relevant information on influenza outbreaks in swine and human populations to 
better parameterize such models at the farm and household levels, which could greatly improve future 
modelling work. 
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Table 1. Parameters and their probability density functions for swine farms used in the simulation of 
influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, Canada. 
Input parameters Individual Herd level References 
Latent period (day) 1
a
 Fixed value of 1
b a 
(Brookes et al., 2010, Lange et al., 2009, Vincent et al., 
2010);  
b 
Generated from the individual-level parameters using WH 
 ? ? ? ? ?ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ? ? 
c
 (Blaskovic et al., 1970, Desrosiers et al., 2004);  
d
 Assumed permanent immunity by using a value greater 
than the duration of the simulation period (365 days) 
Subclinical infectious (day) 0 W6a BetaPERT(0, 3, 6)b 
Clinical infectious (day) 1 W15a BetaPERT (5; 25;45)b 
Immune period (day) 365 W840c Fixed value 366d 
 ?WH 0.9.5 is the software that simulate within-herd disease transmission stochastically and generates herd-level 
durations of disease states (Reeves et al., 2013) ? 
Parameters were extracted from the references with the same superscripts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Parameters and their probability density functions for households used in the simulation of 
influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, Canada. 
Input parameters Individual          Household References 
Latent period (day) 1 W3a BetaPERT (1, 2, 3)b a (Pourbohloul et al., 2009, Boëlle et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 
2010);   
b 
Generated from the individual-level parameters using 
WH 0.9.5 software ?; 
c
 Assumed permanent immunity by using a value greater 
than the duration of the simulation period (365 days) 
Subclinical infectious (day) 0 W3a BetaPERT (0, 2,3)b 
Clinical infectious (day) 4 W10a BetaPERT (4, 12, 20)b 
Immune period (day) - Fixed value of 366
c
 
 ?WH 0.9.5 is the software that simulate within-herd disease transmission stochastically and generates herd-level 
durations of disease states (Reeves et al., 2013). Parameters were extracted from the references with the same 
superscripts. 
 
  
26 
Table 3. Contact structure and influenza transmission parameters used in the simulation of influenza 
spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, Canada. 
 Contact type Mean 
contacts/day 
Distance distribution of 
recipient units (km) 
Probability of  
infection (Low/ 
medium/high) 
References
 
Swine to swine 
 
SH-SH  
(Direct contact) 
0.06
a
 BetaPERT(0.8, 20, 100)
b
 1
c
 
a 
(Christensen et al., 2008, Bates et al., 2001)
 
and unpublished data from Ontario 
Veterinary College;
 b 
Assumption based on 
ƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽ-ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ; 
c 
Assumed based on based on experimental 
studies (Brookes et al., 2010, Lange et al., 
2009, Vincent et al., 2010);
 d 
Bases on the 
assumptions explained in the main text; 
e
 Assumed once/week based on the 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽ-ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐand 
multiplied by half the individual contact rate 
from Lee et al., (2010) and Mossong et al., 
(2008); 
f 
Derived from R0 value of pH1N1 
2009 as explained the text.
  g
 Assumed 5 
times/week based on ƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽ-ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂŶĚmultiplied 
by half the individual contact rate from Lee 
et al., (2010) and Mossong et al., (2008); 
h
 
Assumed once/year based ŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽ-ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ and multiplied 
by the individual contact rate from Lee et 
al., (2010) and Mossong et al., (2008);
  i
 
Assumed twice/year  based on the ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽ-ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂŶĚ multiplied 
by the individual contact rate from Lee et 
al., (2010) and Mossong et al., (2008); 
 j
 
Based on the individual contact rate from 
Lee et al., (2010) and Mossong et al.,  (2008) 
SH-SH  
(Indirect contact) 
0.196
a
 BetaPERT (0.8, 20,100)
b
 0.01
b 
Swine to human 
SH-SWH 1
d
 Uniform(0.1, 0.5)
b
 (0.024/0.3/ 1
d
 
Human to swine 
SWH WSH 1d  Uniform(0.1, 0.5)c (0.024/ 0.3/1)d 
Human to human 
SWH-SWH 0.857
e
 BetaPERT(0.5, 20, 100)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
SWH-RH 4.286
g
 BetaPERT(0.1, 10, 30)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
SWH-UH 0.857
e
 BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
RH-SWH 0.857
e
  BetaPERT(0.1, 10, 30)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
RH-RH 4.286
g 
 BetaPERT(0.01, 20, 100)
b 
(0.024)
 f
 
RH-UH 0.857
e
 BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)
b 
(0.024) 
f
 
UH-SWH  0.036
h 
BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
UH-RH 0.071
i 
 BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)
b 
(0.024) 
f
 
UH-UH  12.893
j
 BetaPERT(0.01, 10, 30)
b
 (0.024) 
f
 
Key: SH = Swine herds, SWH = Swine-worker-households, RH = Rural non-swine-worker-households, UH = Urban 
households. Parameters were extracted from the references with the same superscripts. 
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Table 4 (a). Parameters of control strategies used for simulation models of the simultaneous spread of pandemic 
influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations in a county in Ontario, Canada 
Parameters  Parameter values 
Swine herd Household 
1. Speed of detection Day Slow Moderate Fast Slow Moderate Fast 
(a) Probability of observing clinical signs given 
the number of days that a unit is clinically 
infectious*  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.8 
3 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.95 
5 0.25 0.8 0.99 0.5 0.9 0.99 
10 0.5 0.99 - 0.8 0.99 - 
15 0.9 - - 0.9 - - 
20 0.99 - - 0.99 - - 
(b) Probability of reporting an observed clinical 
unit given the number of days since any 
unit was first detected * 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.1 0.25 0.7 0.1 0.25 0.7 
3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.9 
5 0.7 0.9 0.99 0.7 0.9 0.99 
10 0.8 0.99 - 0.8 0.99 - 
15 0.9 - - 0.9 - - 
20 0.99 - - 0.99 - - 
(c) Probability of the overall detection [(a)*(b)] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1 0.01 0.1 0.49 0.01 0.1 0.56 
 3 0.1 0.36 0.81 0.15 0.42 0.86 
 5 0.18 0.72 0.98 0.35 0.81 0.98 
 10 0.4 0.98 - 0.64 0.98 - 
 15 0.81 - - 0.81 - - 
 20 0.98 - - 0.98 - - 
2. Quarantine strategy  Radius  Radius  
(a) No-zone strategy - quarantine of detected 
units only (however a zone of this radius 
was imposed to control the indirect 
contacts between SH to SH, and SH to SWH, 
and among household units) 
- 0.005 km  0.005 km  
(b) With-zone  strategy  W quarantined all units 
within a zone of this radius around the 
detected units.  
- 3 km  3 km  
3. Effectiveness of movement control (fraction 
of baseline contact rate over time) 
Day Less-effective  Effective 
 
Less-effective Effective
  
  
(a) Movement restriction of direct contacts of 
undetected units within the disease control 
zone (With-zone strategy only)
 §
 
0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
 
 
1 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 
3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 
5 0.3 0.05 0.3 0.05 
10 0.05 - 0.05 - 
(b) Movement restriction for indirect contacts 
upon detection for both No-zone and With-
zone strategy)  
0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 
3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 
5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 
10 0.2 - 0.2 - 
4. Forward contact tracing  Trace success (%) Trace success (%) 
(a) Probability of trace success for the 
movement that occurred within five days of 
detection  for direct contacts 
 0.95 1.0 
(b) Probability of trace success given days  
before the detection for indirect contacts 
 
 
0.6 0.7 
*These cumulative probability distributions were converted to a daily probability distribution using spreadsheet provided by Neil Harvey of the 
University of Guelph and entered into the models. 
§ 
This applies to the direct contacts of undetected units of swine herds (SH) and swine worker 
households to SH contact (SWH to SH contact) under with-zone strategy, as the direct contacts of all detected units were automatically 
quarantined with 100% effectiveness as a default setting in NAADSM. The contacts between between pairs of households were simulated by  
indirect contact. 
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Table 4 (b). Parameters of vaccination strategies used for simulation models of the simultaneous spread of 
pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations in a county in Ontario, Canada 
 
Parameters Parameter value for both swine herds & Households 
5. Vaccination  No-vaccination Slow-trigger Fast-trigger 
(a) Threshold level to start vaccination - ш ? ?ƵŶŝƚƐĚĞƚĞĐƚĞĚ ш5 units detected  
(b) Whether to vaccinate all unit types - Yes Yes 
(c) Delay to immunity following 
vaccination of units (all units) 
- 7 days 7 days 
(d) Vaccine immune period - Permanent Permanent 
(e) Radius of the ring vaccination - 5 km  5 km 
(f) Number of units vaccinated per day 
(all units) 
- Day Capacity/day 
 0 
3 
5 
10 
20 
150 
300 
300 
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Table 5. Time ratios of a multivariable accelerated failure time survival model assessing the control strategies 
against the simulated influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county in Ontario, Canada 
Predictors (input parameters) Time ratios (95% CI) P-values 
1. Speed of detection   
Slow Baseline  
Moderate 0.155 (0.152 W0.159) <0.001 
Fast 0.117 (0.114 W0.119) <0.001 
2. Quarantine strategy   
No-zone Baseline  
With-zone  0.262 (0.257 W0.266) <0.001 
3. Effectiveness of movement restriction   
Less effective Baseline  
Effective 0.833 (0.822 W0.845) <0.001 
4. Speed of detection * quarantine strategy   
Slow * No-zone Baseline  
Moderate * With zone 3.514 (3.434 W3.596) <0.001 
Fast * With zone 3.931 (3.846 W4.017) <0.001 
5. Speed of detection * Effectiveness of movement 
restruction 
  
Slow * Less-effective Baseline  
Moderate * Effective 1.075 (1.054 W1.096) <0.001 
Fast * Effective 1.114 (1.093 W1.136)  <0.001 
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Table 6. Count ratios of a multivariable negative binomial regression model assessing the control strategies against 
the simulated influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county in Ontario, Canada 
Predictors (input parameters) Count ratios (95% CI) P-values 
1. Population type   
Swine herds (SH) Baseline  
Swine worker households (SWH) 1.58 (1.51  W 1.65) <0.001 
Rural non-swine worker households (RH) 2.59 (2.48  W 2.72) <0.001 
Urban non-swine worker households (UH) 1.97 (1.87 -2.07) <0.001 
2. Speed of detection   
Slow Baseline  
Moderate 0.02 (0.02 -0.02) <0.001 
Fast 0.00 (0.00 -  0.00) <0.001 
3. Quarantine strategy   
No-zone Baseline  
With zone  0.04 (0.03 -0.04) <0.001 
4. Effectiveness of movement restriction   
Less effective Baseline  
Effective 0.86 (0.83  W 0.88) <0.001 
5. Population type * speed of detection   
SH * Slow Baseline  
SWH * Moderate 1.03 (0.99  W 1.07) 0.184 
SWH * Fast 0.99 (0.95  W 1.04) 0.693  
RH * Moderate 0.48 (0.46  W 0.50) <0.001 
RH * Fast 0.11 (0.10  W 0.11) <0.001 
UH * Moderate 0.34 (0.32  W 0.35) <0.001 
UH * Fast 0.04 (0.03 -0.04) <0.001 
6. Population type * quarantine strategy   
SH * No zone  Baseline  
SWH * With zone 1.13 (1.08  W 1.17) <0.001 
RH * With zone 0.85 (0.82  W 0.89) <0.001 
UH * With zone 0.69 (0.66  W 0.73) <0.001 
7. Population type * Effectiveness of movement restriction   
SH * Less effective Baseline  
SWH * Effective 0.86 (0.83  W 0.90) <0.001 
RH * Effective 0.88 (0.85  W 0.92) <0.001 
UH * Effective 0.72 (0.70  W 0.76) <0.001 
5. Speed of detection * quarantine strategy   
Slow * No-zone Baseline  
Moderate * With zone 12.46 (12.04  W 12.88) <0.001 
Fast * With zone 30.56 (29.27  W 31.91) <0.001 
6. Speed of detection * Effectiveness of movement restriction   
Slow * Less effective Baseline  
Moderate * Effective 1.05 (1.02  W 1.08) 0.002 
Fast * Effective 0.97 (0.94  W 1.01) 0.180 
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Figure 1: The description of scenarios used for assessing the control strategies against the simultaneous 
spread of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations in a county of 
Ontario, Canada. The infection was seeded in a single randomly selected swine herd. Key: AH = animal to 
human, HA = human to animal. 
 
$
 Direct contacts refer to shipment of live pigs from one farm to another (SH to SH), movement of swine workers from swine 
worker household to swine farms (SWH to SH).  
¥
 Indirect contacts refer to movement of contaminated fomites (equipment, feeds, etc) from farm to farm (SH to SH contacts), 
movement of swine workers from swine farms to swine worker households (SH to SWH contact), and contacts among people 
from different households at workplaces, shopping malls, and other social congregations (contacts amongst SWH, RH and UH) 
 
   
Control strategies 
Speed of detection 
1. Slow = 11-20 days 
2. Moderate= 6-10 days 
3. Fast = 1-5 days 
 
Effectiveness of movement 
restriction 
1. Less-effective = requiring 
10 days to achieve 80% 
(direct
$
)and 95% (indirect
¥
) 
contact reduction 
2. Effective = requiring 5 days 
to achieve 80% (direct
$
) 
and 95% (indirect
¥
) contact 
reduction 
Ring vaccination  
(d5 km radius)  
1. No-vaccination 
2. Slow-trigger = start 
ш25 units infected 
3. Fast-trigger = start 
ш5 units infected 
Transmissibility of the 
virus at the swine-
human interface 
 
1. Low = 0.024  
2. Medium = 0.3  
3. High = 1.0 
 
Slow  
Moderate 
Fast 
Less-effective 
Effective 
Slow  
Moderate 
Fast 
Less-effective 
Effective 
Slow-trigger 
Fast-trigger 
1. Quarantine of 
detected units only  
(No-zone) 
2. Quarantine of 
detected plus all units 
d3 km radius  
(With-zone) 
3. Quarantine of 
detected plus all units 
(d3km radius) + Ring 
vaccination d5km 
radius) 
No-vaccination 
Low AH  W Low HA (LL) 
Med. AH  W Low HA 
(ML) 
High AH  W Med HA 
(HM) 
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Figure 2: The interaction effect of the speed of detection and quarantine strategy on the duration of the 
outbreaks: (a) less-effective movement control, and (b) effective movement control strategy. The error 
bar shows the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the duration of the outbreaks. Only the results of 
high animal to human  W medium human to animal (HM) transmissibility of the virus are shown. Key: No-
zone = quarantine of the detected units only; With-zone = quarantine of all units within the 3km radius 
of the detected units; Less-effective movement restriction = 100% decrease in the baseline direct 
contact of all detected units, 95% decrease in the baseline direct contacts of undetected units within the 
quarantine zone and 80%  decrease in the indirect contacts, all within 5 days; Effective movement 
restriction = same levels of decrease in the baseline contact rates as less-effective movement restriction 
but all achieved within 10 days.  
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Figure 3: The interaction effect of the speed of detection and movement restriction strategy on the 
duration of the outbreaks at: (a) no-zone , and (b) with-zone quarantine strategy. The error bar shows the 
predicted 95% confidence intervals of the duration of the outbreak. Only the results of high animal to 
human  W medium human to animal (HM) transmissibility of the virus are shown. Key: refer to Figure 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: The interaction effects of speed of detection and quarantine strategy on the size of the 
outbreaks. The error bars show the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the size of the outbreaks. Only 
the results of high animal to human  W medium human to animal (HM) transmissibility of the virus at the 
Less-effective movement restriction strategy is shown. Key: SH = swine herds; SWH = swine worker 
households; RH = rural non-swine worker households; UH = urban households; No-zone  = quarantined 
detected units only, With-zone = quarantined all units within 3 km radius of the detected infected units.  
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Figure 5: The interaction effects of speed of detection and movement restriction strategy on the size of 
the outbreaks. The error bars show the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the size of the outbreaks. 
Only the results of high animal to human  W medium human to animal (HM) transmissibility of the virus at 
No-zone quarantine strategy are shown. Key: SH = swine herds, SWH = swine worker households, RH = 
rural non-swine worker households, UH = urban households; Less-effective movement restriction = 
100% decrease in the baseline direct contact of all detected units, 95% decrease in the baseline direct 
contacts of undetected units within the quarantine zone and 80%  decrease in the indirect contacts, all 
within 5 days; Effective movement restriction = same levels of decrease in the baseline contact rates as 
less-effective movement restriction but all achieved within 10 days.  
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